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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW




The Treaty Clause of the Constitution, Article 2, Section 2, reads as follows:
"He (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur."
Under the treaty clause of the Constitution, the President initiates and car-
ries on the treaty proceedings. Once the treaty has been found acceptable to him,
he submits the treaty to the Senate for concurrence:
"Not only is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs but partici-
pation in the exercise of power is significantly limited. In this 'vast ex-
ternal realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a repre-
sentative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate, but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it."I
Therefore, when Senator Lodge and thirty-nine other Senators, more -than
one-third of the Senate, resolved "that it was the sense of the Senate that peace
terms should first be negotiated with Germany and that the proposal for a League
of Nations should then be taken up 'for careful consideration',"3 the signers were
acting unconstitutionally. The -act was a deliberate, and as it turned out later, a
successful attempt on the part of a group of Senators to insert themselves into
the negotiations of a treaty.
So vast is the power of the President in the matter of treaties, excepting
the consent and concurrence thereto by the Senate, that the President may, once
the Senate has consented to the treaty, "put it in his desk never again to see the
light of day, as h'e was free to determine in the first instance whether he would
or would not negotiate it . . .It is a power which inheres in him as the sole
organ under the Constitution through whom our foreign relations and diplomatic
intercourse are conducted . . .Why? Because the President, through the am-
bassadors, ministers and consuls, and all of the agencies of the government, ex-
* B. S., Bucknell, 1911; LL. B., Stetson, 1928; City Attorney, Winter Garden, Florida; Ar.
ticles published in Florida Bar Journal and University of Miami Law Quarterly.
1 Mr. Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al, 299 U. S.
304, 319.
2 BEMis, Dip. HIsT. oF U. S. oF A., p. 642.
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plores sources of information everywhere, it is his business to know whether any-
thing has occurred since the Senate acted . ..which would render it for the pub-
lic interest, that the ratification be not exchanged." s
Further, the Treaty Clause of the Constitution is not limited expressly and
though it does not extend "so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids",
it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and
other nations,' or as Congressman David John Lewis said in the House on Feb-
ruary 17, 1917:
"A law must be in 'pursuance' of the Constitution; a treaty is not re-
quired to be.''5
The reason for this is obvious:
"Laws operate on!y on land over which the government is exclu-
sive sovereign, and can thus formulate them as to conform to the Con-
stitution. But treaties opcrate upon other nations, and must, therefore,
conform to the wills of all the signatory powers. '6
"I think it is perfectly idle to consider (said Charles Evans Hughes,
then President of the American Society of International Law) that the
Supreme Court will ever hold that any treaty made in a constitutional
manner in relation to the external concerns of the nation is beyond the
power of the sovereignty of the United States or is invalid under the
Constitution where no express prohibition of the Constitution has been
violated." 7
"The learned Justice (Story) added th,-t he had some years pre-
viously had a conversation with Chief Justice Marshall on the subject.
He was unequivocally of the opinion that the treaty-making power did
extend to cases of cession of territory. "s
International law is a part of the law of the land. There is nothing in the
Constitution nor in International Law prohibiting the Union from entering a
World League and at the same time delegating to such League the power of con-
trol over contingents of our armed forces.
"International Law (said Mr. Justice Gray) is a part of our law
and must be ascertained and administered by the Courts of Justice as
often as questions of right are duly presented for their determination. "9
By reason of the above theory of law, the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the
legality of the "Migratory Bird Treaty" with Canada, despite "invisible radiations
from the general terms of the 10th Amendment." 10
8 Speech, Senator Spooner, Foreign Relations Committee, Cong. Rec. Vol. 40, Pt. 2, pp
1418-1419.
, Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U. S. 332.
5 Cong. Rec. Vol. 54, Pt. 4, p 3508; and Holland v. Missouri, 252 U. S. 416.
6 Hackworth, Vol. 5, D. 1. L., p 6.
7 Speech, April 26, 1929.
8 1 Kent 167-284; Moore, INT. L. D., 173-174; 133 U. S. 276.
9 "The Paquete Habana" v. U. S., 175 U. S. 677-694.
10 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416.
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"No doubt", wrote Mr. Justice Holmes (in a majority opinion), "the
great body of private relations usually falls within the control of the
state, but a treaty may override the power. We do not have to invoke
the later development of constitutional law for this proposition; it was
recognized as early as Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454. " 1
On July 3, 1900, Secretary of State John Hay sent out a circular to the Great
Powers stating:
"In the critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate
to define the attitude of the United States as present circumstances per-
mit this to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of
peace with the Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and
of protection of lives and property of our citizens by all means guaran-
teed under extraterritorial treaty rights, and by the law of nations. If
wrong be done to our citizens we propose to hold the responsible authors
to the uttermost accountability . ..The purpose of the President (Mc-
Kinley) is, as it has been heretofore, to act concurrently with the other
powers." 1
2
"August 8, 1900, Mr. Jackson, American Charge at Berlin, inquir-
ed, at the solicitation of the German government whether the United
States would put its forces under the Chief Command of Field Marshal
Count von Waldersee, Japan and Russia having already expressed their
willingness to do so. In accepting this proposal the Department of State
declared that the United States would be gratified to secure the command
of so distinguished and experienced an officer as Count Waldersee for
any combined military operations in -which tie American troops take part,
after the arrival of that distinguished officer in China, to attain the pur-
pose declared by this government in the circular note delivered to the
powers under date of July ...
In World War I, American troops served under the overall command of
Marshal Foch of France, and in World War II, all allied troops in Western Europe
served under the command of the American General Eisenhower by agreement
between the Chief Executives of the nations concerned. The American Congress
had nothing to do with the above military agreements.
"As between treaties and laws they are placed under the same foot-
ing under our Constitutional processes. Both are declared to be the law
of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to one over the other. If in-
consistent the last one in date will control."'"
Therefore, if an act of Congress may override a treaty or a treaty override
an act of Congress, we need not be surprised if a custom has grown up in the
union wherein treaties and acts of Congress are used interchangeably. The Con-
stitution does not forbid this practice.
II Ibid.
12 Circular of July 3, 1900. MOORE, INT. LAW DiG., Vol. 5, 481-482.
13 MOORE, INT. LAW DIG., Vol. 5, 483.
14 U. S. v. Thompson, 258 Fed. 257; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190; Horner v. U. S.,
143 U. S. 570.
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Under the Constitution a treaty may be accepted only after it has been con-
sented to and concurred in by a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. Since
the votes of some Senators are often controlled by their political and economic
predilections, it follows that treaties under the Constitution may be defeated on
purely personal grounds.
Senator," said Senator Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, to Senator Watson, Republican of Indiana, "'d
like you to be my special representative in the Senate on the League of
Nations fight." "Of course, Senator, but I don't see how we are going
to defeat this proposition. It appears to me that some eighty per cent of
the people are for it. Fully that percentage of preachers are right now
advocating it, churches are very largely favoring it, all the people who
have been burdened and oppressed by this awful tragedy of wax, and
who imagine this opens the way to world peace are for it, and I don't
see how it is possible to defeat it." "Ah, my dear James," replied the dis-
tinguished Senator from Massachusetts, "I do not propose to try to beat
it by direct frontal attack, but by the indirect method of reservations ...
For instance, the question of the mandate over Armenia,-we could
merely demand a reservation on the subject. We can debate that for days
and hold up the dangers, and we can thoroughly satisfy the country that
that would be a most abhorrent policy for us to adopt."15
"It seemed," said Lodge to Senator Borah, "that any attempt to
d'efeat the treaty of Versailles by a straight vote in the Senate, if taken
immediately, would be hopeless, even if it were desirable. I told him
that in any event there was only one thing to do, and that was to pro-
ceed in the discussion of the treaty by way of amendment and reserva-
tion."' 6
"Beveridge, like Borah, wanted to meet the League head-on, to
oppose it in principle. Painstakingly Lodge explained to him that thq
had to be careful; and at length Beveridge saw the point. Perhaps delay,
after all, was a useful weapon." 17
"Accordingly, forty-five amendments and four reservations, to-
gether with eighteen others added by Lodge were submitted by the
Foreign Relations Committee for discussion along with the Treaty. When
Congress convened May 19, 1919, the amendments and reservations were
introduced. It was by way of delay, by interminable hearings, by slow
formulation of amendments and reservations that the Committee on
Foreign Relations, with a majority of its members hostile to the League,
proceeded to consider the Treaty."'"
Finally, on November 19, 1919, after months of wrangling, the Treaty was
defeated. The Treaty, with -all reservations and amendments was defeated by the
Senate 39 for and 55 against. The Treaty, together with five amendments offered
by the Democrats was beaten by 41 votes for and 51 against. The Treaty with-
15 BURLINGAME AND STEPHENS, VICTORY WITHOUiT PEACE, pp 201-203,
16 BEMis, Dip. HIST. OF U. S., p 645; footnote LODGE, SENATE AND LEAGUE, 147.
17 BURLINCAME AND STEPHENS, VICTORY WITHOUT PEACE, pp 201-203.
18 bEMiS Dip. HIST, OF U. S. p 645.
TREATIES UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
out reservations was beaten 38 votes for to 53 against. Finally the Treaty, with
the Lodge reservations, was rejected 49 votes for and 35 votes against.19
Thus was a predicate laid for World War I1-a war that was to cost the
world the death of thirty million people and the expenditure of a thousand billion
dollars-and the end is not yet. It was not enough that we were then paying off
the costs of World War I, to-wit: The death of seventeen million people and
the expenditure of five hundred billion dollars.
And so a President became a prophet:
"I tell you, my fellow citizens," said President Wilson, "I can pre-
dict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will
be another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the
method by which to prevent it.''20
Senator Lodge admitted that public opinion overwhelmingly favored the
League. He understood very well the difficulties the Union would encounter if
the Treaty failed, for on January 24, 1899, at a time when he feared greatly that
the Treaty closing the war with Spain would fail of concurrence, he warned the
Senate:
"Suppose we reject the Treaty: What follows? Let us look at it prac-
tically. We continue the state of war, and every sensible man in the coun-
try, every business interest, desires the reestablishment of peace in law
as well as in fact. At the same time we repudiate the President and his
action before the world, and the repudiation of the President in such a
matter as this is, to my mind, th-c humiliation of the United States in the
eyes of civilized mankind and brands us as a people incapable of great
affairs or of taking rank where we belong, as one of the great world
powers."21
"I long ago made up my mind (wrote Secretary of State John Hay)
that no treaty on which discussion was possible, no treaty that gave room
for difference of opinion, could ever pass the Senate. "22
"A treaty entering the Senate" (said Mr. Hay) "is like a bull going
into the arena; no one can say just how the blow will fall, or when, but
one thing is certain-it will never leave the arena alive." 23
"Treaties are compacts cntered into between sovereign nations for
the purpose of creating new rights and new duties or defining exist-
ing ones."
24
"In law the effect of an agreement between nations is not depen-
ent upon the name given to the instrument. In the United States both
treaties and conventions are sent to the Senate for ratification and if
19 Ibid., 648.
20 Speech at Omaha, Nebraska, Sept .8, 1919.
21 Cong. Rec. Jan. 24, 1899; BEMIs, Dip. HIST. OF U. S. pp 644-645.
22 THAYER, LIFE OF JOHN HAY, Vol. II, p 273.
23 Ibid., p 393.
24 FENWICK, INT. LAw, pp 318-924.
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a distinction can be drawn, it amounts to this-'Treaties generally deal
with political matters such as 'friendship, peace, guaranty, cession, boun-
daries, arbitration and naturalization.' In deciding on questions arising
under a treaty, the courts look to the effect of the agreement and not
to the name by which the agreement is called.' -25
"Doubtless the most important international agreement evtr entered into by
the Executive without the advice and consent of the Senate, was the Armistice or
Peace Protocol with Spain, concluded August 12, 1898. The protocol covered an
immediate evacuation by Spain of Puerto Rico and other islands of the West In-
dies, in connection with the promise of formal cession to the United States later. ' ' 26
In fact, in international law an armistice has been used time and again to ter-
minate war.
"War may come to an end by the simple cessation of hostilities.
Wars, which terminated by cessation of hostilities include the following:
Sweden-Poland, 1716; France-Spain, 1720; and Texas-Mexico, 1836."27
An exchange of diplomatic notes has often sufficed, without any formality
or exchange of ratification or even of proclamation, to effect purposes usually
accomplished by the more complex machinery of treaties. On December 9, 1850,
Britain ceded to the United States the Canadian territory of the "Horseshoe Reef"
in the Niagara River by such an exchange of notes. 28
History of Treaty Clause
On September 7, 1787, the Committee of Eleven returned the Treaty Clause
of the Constitution to the convention floor, reading as follows:
"The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
shall have power to make treaties. But no treaty shall be made without
the consent of two-thirds of the members present.''29
The clause was debated on the same day, and Madison moved to amend by
adding the words: "except treaties of peace. Such treaties", said Madison, "were
made with less difficulty than other treaties." The amendment was carried by a
vote of 8 states to 3.80
The following day Delegate King moved to strike the words: "except trea-
ties of peace." Wilson desired "that the two-thirds rule be abolished. If the ma-
jority cannot be trusted it was proof we were not fit for one society." Morris sug-
gested that "if the two-thirds rule obtained the legislature would refuse to make
war on account of the fisheries or the Mississippi, and if a majority be for peace
and are not allowed to make it they will be apt to negative the supplies for war."
25 Lukich v. Dept. of Labor, 176 Wash. 228, 27 P.2d 388.
26 MOORE, INT. L. DIG. Vol 5, p. 213.
27 67 CORPUS JuRis 429; Note 29b.
28 MOORE, TNT. LAw DIGEST, Vol. 5, p. 215.
29 D. H. of Coast. U. S. of A., V. 3, pp 669-670.
80 Ibid., 697-700.
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Wilson stated that if two-thirds were necessary to make peace the minority
may perpetuate war. Gerry enlarged on the danger of putting the "essential rights
of the Union (fisheries, the Mississippi River and Basin and New Orleans, and
the Western Land Claims) in the hands of so small a number as the majority of
the Senate representing perhaps not one-fifth of the people."
Now by a vote of eight states to three the words "except treaties of peace"
were stricken from the treaty clause. And so the clause was reamended to read as
follows; after being re-styled:
'He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present con-
cur.
It follows that the present treaty clause was inserted into the Constitution
by reason of the jealousies of the various states and because of sectional differ-
ences. With a limited number of senators eligible to the body-28, fifteen mem-
bers would make a quorum and eight senators conclude a treaty. Better a treaty
concluded with a majority of ten rather than one of but eight senators or less.
However, as the Union increased its state membership the clause in fact be-
came outmoded. Hence, various means of overcoming the clause were conceived
as a matter of national necessity.
The rule is clear enough-as has been stated by Mr. Justice Douglas:
"The choices left by the generality of a Constitution relate to policy.
That is why laymen and lawyers must look widely for understanding.
' a
"When we are dealing with words," wrote Mr. Justice Holmes,
"that are also a constitutient act, like the constitution-we must realize
that they have called into life a being the development of which could
not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.
It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an
organism-it has taken and has cost their successors much sweat and
blood to prove that they created a nation."'32
Because of the threat to ratification implicit in the Treaty Clause of the Con-
stitution, American statesmen have been forced to resort to policies other than
treaties as a means of carrying out national policy-witness the following:
President McKinley and Hawaii
"Pending consideration by the Senate of the treaty signed June 16, 1897, by
the Plenipotentiaries of the United States and of the Republic of Hawaii, pro-
viding for the annexation of the Islands, a joint resolution to accomplish the same
purpose by accepting the offered cession and incorporating the ceded territory
into the Union was adopted by the Congress and approved July 7, 1898. I there-
upon directed the USS Philadelphia to convey Rear Admiral Miller to Honolulu,
31 Cardoza Lecture, 4-12-49.
32 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416. (A decision interpreting the Treaty Clause).
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and intrusted to his hands this important Legislative Act, to be delivered to the
President of the Republic of Hawaii with whom the Admiral and the U. S. Minis-
ters were authorized to make appropriate arrangements for transferring the sov-
ereignty of the Islands to the United States. This was simply but impressively
accomplished on the 12th of August, last, by the delivery of a certified copy of
the resolution to President Dole, who thereupon yielded up to the representative
of the government of the United States the sovereignty and public property of
the Hawaiian Islands. 1
Now the reason for substituting the Joint Resolution for the Treaty, in the
Hawaiian affair, was as follows:
"President McKinley after his inauguration, immediately turned his
attention to Hawaii, negotiated a new treaty of annexation and sent it
to the Senate on the same day for its signature (June 16, 1897). At this
time the Hawaiian government had become alarmed at the significant
volume of Japanese immigrants and had just turned back 1,000 of them.
Japan had protested against this as a violation of her Treaty of 1886 with
Hawaii. When Harrison's Treaty of Annexation had been signed in
1893, Japan cheerfully acquiesced. Since then she had defeated China-
and now felt that she was a power to be reckoned with, in the settle-
ment of any Pacific question. She protested annexation, on the ground
that it might further jeopardize the treaty rights of Japanese residents
in Hawaii . . .The Japanese action had nerved McKinley to speed an-
nexation. In the Senate there were enough reluctant Democrats and anti-
imperialist Republicans to endanger the two-thirds majority for the
treaty. While the treaty lagged there, the President, in March, 1898, re-
sorting to the precedent of Texas, urged annexation by a joint resolution
of Congress, which required only a majority vote in the Senate. On July
7, 1898, the anxious McKinley was able to sign a resolution of annexa-
tion." 3s
And so, regardless of the fact that treaties, in the United States, are used in
the settlement of questions of cession, supra, joint resolutions have been used to
tht same end after treaties on the same subjects were on the verge of being de-
feated or actually were defeated.
Secretary of State John Calhoun and Texas
"A treaty for the annexation of Texas to the United States was sign-
ed at Washington by Mr. Calhoun, on the part of the United States, and
Messrs. Van Zandt and Henderson on the part of Texas, April 12, 1844.
It was rejected by the Senate. Mr. Calhoun directed the Charge d'Affairs
of the United States to assure the government of Texas that the loss of
the treaty did not necessarily involve the failure of the project of annexa-
tion. It was admitted, said Mr. Calhoun, that what was sought to be ef-
fected by the treaty might be secured by joint resolution which would
have the advantage of requiring only a majority of the House, instead of
two-thirds of the Senate. By a joint resolution, approved March 1, 1845,
33 Pres. McKinley's Annual Message, Dec. 8, 1898, See S Doc. 16, 55 Cong. 3 sess.
34 BEMIS, A DIPL. HIST. OF U. S., pp 461-2.
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Congress expressed its consent that the territory properly included with-
in and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas might be erected
into a new state, to be called the State of Texas, with a republican form
of government, to be adopted by the people of said republic in order
that the state might be admitted as one of the states of the Union."85
The year 1845 found the membership of Congress so certain that a joint
resolution could be used in place of a treaty, and for the same purpose, that Con-
gress appropriated the sum of $100,000.00 to defray the expense of missions and
negotiations leading to terms of cession and admission of Texas into the Union,
either by treaty to be submitted to the Senate, or by articles to be submitted to the
two houses of Congress, as the President might direct.
8
Executive Agreements
As with joint resolutions, so with executive agreements.
"Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties
and conventions are commonly referred to as Executive Agreements.
They are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments-treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the
form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal docu-
ments, denominated agreements or protocols. They cover such subjects
as 'The Inspection of Vessels, Navigation Dues, Income Tax on Shipping
Profits, the Admission of Civil Aircraft, Customs Matters and Commer-
cial Relations; International Claims, Postal Matters and Registration of
Trade Marks and Copyrights.' Some of them are concluded under author-
ity of acts of Congress, others were concluded not by specific congres-
sional authorization, but in conformity with policies declared in Acts
of Congress-such as tariff acts; whil-e still others, were concluded inde-
pendently of any legislation." 
3
7
"On the matter of executive agreements," (says Hackworth), "the
President has no free hand; he must act scrupulously within the laws
and conform to the policies already established by Congress." 38,
The famous "Rush-Bagot" agreement of 1817, covering the Great Lakes,
wherein the United States and Britain entered into the first of limitation of arma-
ments arrangements was concluded by a mere exchange of notes between Mr.
Bagot, British Minister at Washington, and Mr. Rush, Secretary of State. Orders
were given at once by the proper executive officers of the two governments
for its execution, and if later, the President in an abundance of caution, and at
the demand of the British government, placed the agreement or exchange of
notes before the Senate for ratification, in principle, one of our greatest triumphs
of diplomacy, was entered into and completed by a mere exchange of notes. 89
35 Moore, INT. LAW DID., 453-456.
36 Moore, JNT. LAw DIG., Vol. I, 450, 5 Stat. 797.
37, Hackworth, INT. L. DIG. Vol. 5, 397-98.
38 INT. LAW DIG., Vol. 398.
39 Moore, INT. LAW DIG., Vol. 5, pp 214-215.
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Since treaties, customarily, are used to cover matters as important as the limi-
tation of armaments, here was and is a distinct aberration from the Treaty Clause
of the Constitution; as much so as was the entrance of Texas and Hawaii into the
Union by way of Joint Resolutions.
During the year 1904, certain European governments, inclusive of Germany,
then, as ever, an opponent of the Monroe Doctrine, threatened to collect debts
owed their nationals by Santa Domingo through force-blockade and bombard-
ment. President Theodore Roosevelt intervened through the Monroe Doctrine,
and had his agents draw and sign a protocol with the authorities of Santa Do-
mingo, giving the agents of the United States the right to collect all Dominican
customs. Thereafter the United States would arrange with the creditor nations
for the payment of their claims by peaceable means.
The protocol was sent to the Senate for ratification. The Senate recessed
without ratifying the protocol, and President Roosevelt intervened under his own
authority. With the assistance of a naval officer acting as Special Commissioner,
the U. S. minister moved in on that unhappy country, collected and administered
the customs of the Republic, according to a modus vivendi under the protecting
presence of American battleships. The European powers called off their threat-
ened use of force.
40
Writing of the affair, President Theodore Roosevelt stated:
"The Constitution did not explicitly give me the power to bring
about the necessary agreement with Santa Domingo. But the Constitution
did not forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect,
and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted and
I would have continued it until the end of my term, if necessary, with-
out any action by Congress, so that we might be proceeding under a
treaty which was the law of the land, and not merely by a direction of the
Chief Executive, which would lapse when that particular executive left
office. I, therefore, did my best to get the Senate to ratify what I had
done. There was a great deal of difficulty about it. Enough Republicans
were absent to prevent the securing of a two-thirds vote, and the Senate
adjourned without any action at all, and with a feeling of entire satisfac-
tion at having left the country in the position of assuming a responsibility
and then failing to fulfill it. Somebody had to do that duty, and, accord-
ingly, I did it. I went ahead and administered the proposed treaty any-
how, considering it as a simple agreement on the part of the Executive
which would be converted into a treaty whenever the Senate acted. After
a couple of years, the Senate did act, having previously made some ut-
terly unimportant changes which I ratified, and persuaded Santa Do-
mingo to ratify."
41
40 BEMIS DIp. HIST. OF U. S., 525-526.
41 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 551-552; 1905 F. Rel. 298-391 and 1906
P-I, 559-564, and 1907, Pt. I, 306-360.
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Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain
In 1940, Britain, and Britain alone, was standing off the power of the most
powerful nation on earth. The British fleet was stretched around the world al-
most to the breaking point. With Britain defeated and her people enslaved and
killed off, and with the Union divided between interventionists and isolationists
America's peril was great. Defeat of Britain would have enabled the Axis Powers
to attack the Western Powers in a giant pincers movement, with Germany strik-
ing from the east and the Japs from the west.
"'By an arrangement embodied in notes exchanged by the Secre-
tary of State and the British Ambassador on September 2, 1940, the
government of the United States transferred fifty over-age destroyers to
the British Government in return for the right to lease naval bases from
Britain in the Atlantic. The agreement was in line with the German-
Russian precedent of 1904 and 1905, when Germany sold Russia a
number of torpedo boats and auxiliary liners at a time when Japan and
Russia were at war. They (destroyers) were not built with World War
II in mind."'
4
Here a treaty was called for since lands and personal property totaling mil-
lions of dollars were involved. A simple agreement between agents of the re-
spective governments gave Britain, and indeed all the democratic world, a new
lease on life.
From the precedents cited above, it can be taken that under the Constitution
and International Law our Chief Executive has at all times the means at hand
whereby he may defend our sovereignty without incurring the risk of extended
debate. Time is of the essence when self-defense is at stake.
The Lend-Lease Act of Marcb 11, 1941
In his letter transmitting to Congress his report upon operations under the
Lend-Lease Act of 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt, with respect to the period
before adoption of that measure, said:
"In those dark days when France was falling, it was clear that this
government, to carry out the will of the people, had to render aid over
and above the material coming off the assembly line. This government
made available all that it possibly could out of its surplus stock of muni-
tions. In June of 1940, the British Government received from our sur-
plus stocks, rifles, machine guns, field artillery, ammunition and air-
craft in a valu'e of more than forty-three millions of dollars. This was
equipment that would have taken months and months to produce and
which, with the exception of aircraft, cost about three hundred millions
of dollars to produce during the World War period. Most of this ma-
terial would not have been usable if we had kept it much longer. This
equipment arrived in Britain after the retreat from Dunkirk, where the
British had lost great quantities of guns and other military supplies. No
one can appraise what effect the delivery of these supplies had upon the
42 Hackworth, INT. LAw DIG., Vol. 7, 419-21. 40 Stat. 222, Act of June 15, 1917.
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successful British resistance in the summer and fall of 1940 when they
were fighting against such terrific odds."' 8
"Since July, 1940 this government has continued to supply war ma-
terial from its surplus stocks in addition to the material produced by
private manufacturers."
It will be noted that the report covered the period beginning in June of 1940.
The Lend-Lease Act was not passed and approved by the President until March
11, 1941. For nearly a year the President acting under the Constitution and In-
ternational Law, "loaned or leased" to "a friendly belligerent," material usually
provided for by treaty, if at all. The President knew just how desperate was the
condition of Britain, a democracy, fighting for its very life. Had he taken the time
and trouble to make the above deliveries to Britain through a treaty, the chances
are even that the treaty would have failed or been held up for a period of months,
a period within which Britain might have fallen. The Lend-Lease Act passed the
Senate with but 60 votes for the bill and 31 votes against it. Had the issue gone
before the Senate as a treaty, it would have been lost."
Th-e denial of the above supplies at that time would, in all probability, have
brought about the defeat of Britain. We would then have lost the powerful bridge-
head of the British Isles as a base from which to strike and defeat Hitler's western
armies. With the British Islands lost to the democracies we would have been
forced to fight back to the European or North African mainland from a distance
of 2500 miles, at a cost of thousands of lives.
"The Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, now popularly call-
ed 'Lend-Lease Act', approved March 11, 1941, called for reciprocal lending of
money and materials and shipping by the United States to all Allied Nations.
The subjects covered by the Act came well within those usually inserted in trea-
ties, nevertheless the aid was given to the Allies through an Act of Congress."
Conclusion
From the very beginning of our government, statesmen-presidents have en-
countered difficulty in the handling of foreign affairs because of the power of
a Senate minority. President Washington appeared before the Senate in an at-
tempt to show the need for a particular treaty and was so viciously cross-examined
and heckled that he swore never again to appear before that body. He kept his word.
"It has been made impossible," said President Wilson, "for Ameri-
ca to speak with a bold and united voice. Nearly every important treaty
the country has been called upon to make has become a bone of conten-
tion between the Executive and the Senate. It is certain that in the years
to come, if we are to go forward in the new paths and stand for a clear-
cut world policy, we must devise some method of speaking to the world
promptly and with an undivided voice. Our present system leads to utter
48 Hackworth, DIG. OF INT. LAw, Vol. 7, 690-691.
44 Cong. Rec., Vol. 87, p 2097.
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weakness, muddle, and delay; it forces both sides to play politics, and
instead of meeting the issue squarely to indulge in a vast controversy over
the prerogatives of two coordinate branches of the government. The
deadlock between the Executive and the Senate every time we face a
really critical foreign problem is intolerable. It not only disgraces us be-
fore the nations, but in some future crisis may ruin us." 45
Small wonder, then that under the Constitution and International Law out
statesmen have been forced to circumvent the Treaty Clause of the Constitution
by entering into Executive Agreements, Exchange of Notes, Acts of Congress,
Joint Resolutions and Presidential Messages (witness the Monroe Doctrine) in
order to carry out principles necessary to the general welfare, foreign or domestic.
Apriori President Wilson was not foreclosed when he lost the Versailles
Treaty to the Senate in 1919. In the sphere of foreign affairs, what with joint
resolutions, lease-lend agreements, executive agreements and protocols, the Presi-
dent is fully armed at all times with an inarticulate major premise.
In our government today there is little cohesion and responsibility. Once a
Republican majority comes into control of the Congress and the presidency, Re-
publican Progressives make common cause with Democrats to restrain the ma-
jority party from carrying out the pledges of the platform. If the Democrats take
over the government, reactionaries from majority and minority club together to
defeat Democratic policy. The signers of the Constitution never bargained for a
government such as this. Suppose, in these days of blitz-atomic warfare, we were
to be treacherously attacked at a time when Congress were in the control of. ont
party and the Chief Executive controlled by the other.
Foreign diplomats understand the workings of the American Government
and hesitate to enter into agreements with the Union. They realize that a minority
of Senators is always in a position, if a treaty is involved, to hamstring world policy.
Recently the Earl of Halifax, present British Ambassador to the United
States, stated the case as follows:
"Another aspect of the problem is that the British Government,
being cohesive with Parliament, is in a much better position to make
binding commitments than is the Executive Branch of this government.
Thus while the British could make reasonably firm statements as to what
they might do as to tariffs, our (the Anerican) negotiators could offer
nothing more concrete than to proceed to a downward revision of the
tariffs under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act." 48
The British and French Premiers wvere faced with the same situation in deal-
ing with President Wilson at the Versailles Conference in 1919. Both Lloyd
George and Clemenceau -were in position, vis a vis their respective governments,
46 WOODROW WILSON AND THE WORLD SETTLEMENT (1922), Vol. 1; p 316.
46 N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1945, p 7.
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to carry out any engagement they signed. They knew to a certainty that President
Wilson could not carry out his contract with France and England since the United
State Senate had given notice that a cabal was even then powerful enough to veto
any engagement signed by President Wilson.
The British and French fears were well founded. The United States Senate
rejected the treaty and the wishes and hopes of millions of people died. Then fol-
lowed the Jap entry into Manchuria, the rape of Ethiopia, the overthrow of the
Spanish Republic by the combined strength of Spanish Monarchist Rebels and
fascists out of Germany and Italy, the rise of another Genghis Khan in Hitler,
thi death of thirty million men, women and children, and the expenditure of a
thousand billion dollars.
Unless we find a means of making the government cohesive-that is, of mak-
ing the majority party and the President one in both domestic and foreign policy,
we face danger. We are still confronted with the situation stated by Delegate
Wilson, later brilliant conservative member of the Supreme Court under appoint-
ment from President Washington:
"A Prime Minister," said Wilson, "must keep himself in favor with
the majority, a President need only keep alive.'
In times past, distance or the British fleet or the British-French armies, or,
as in the period of the war between the states, the Russian fleet, gave us the time
within which to prepare for defense. Today in matters of foreign and domestic
policy-for at times it is difficult to distinguish between them-time is vital, and
unless we have a government in position to meet conditions as they arise instantly
we face annihilation.
"Time," said General Eisenhower, "has always been of the essence
in warfare but never was it more essential than in our most recent war.
With the introduction of atomic and electronic warfare and the astound-
ing advances being made almost hourly in aerial warfare, the tempo is
increasing in geometric progression. If war comes to us again the fact
seems inescapable that we will not have time to train units before we
are faced with the final issue of defeat or victory. Certainly it would be
unconscionable to gamble on a fortuitous recurrence of the time to pre-
pare bought by the blood of our allies in 1917 and in 1942.
"We must be prepared on M-day-the day the enemy strikes--or
we may never be prepared to avert defeat at the hands of any aggressor
who uses against us the weapons of the future."
47
No longer do we have time for the Senate to debate matters of foreign policy
ad infinitum. Either the majority party and the President must be made cohesive
so that decisions can be made without extended debate, or we will perish.
47 N. Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1945, p 6.
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"The object and end of all government," said Chief Justice Taney,
"is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which
it is established; and it cannot, therefore, be assumed that the govern-
ment intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which
it was created."' 48
and
"It is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring nation-
al action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every
civilized government is not to be found.'"49
and
"We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the government
to sit by while its food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests
and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the states.
The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the
the United States is forbidden to act."1 0
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